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Changing the Rules of the
Game: Offshore Financial
Centers, Regulatory
Competition & Financial Crises
Andrew P. Morriss*
Even ardent proponents of free mar-
kets often concede a significant role for
the state in providing the "rules of the
game" for market competition by creating
contract and property law, providing dis-
pute resolution services, and enforcing
court judgments.' At the same time,
those favoring a more substantial role for
the state resist politically inconvenient
charges that interventionist policies can
lead down Friedrich Hayek's "Road to
Serfdom" 2 by arguing they merely seek to
"level the playing field" by adding suffi-
cient safeguards to prevent fraud and fi-
nancial crises, preserving market
competition while taming what they view
as its excesses.8 However, because goods,
services, capital, and people can move
across borders, states must compete for
these resources. That competition limits
the ability of states to move toward the
interventionist end of the spectrum and
* H. Ross & Helen Workman Professor of Law and Business and Professor, Institute for Government and
Public Affairs, University of Illinois.
1. See Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: The Intractable Problem of Antitrust, COM-
PETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, May 2004, at 3. ("Make govern-
ment prevent force and fraud; otherwise, let people do what they will. That position leads quite naturally to the
development of ordinary markets . . ..")
2. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (University of Chicago Press) (1944).
3. See, e.g., Tax Justice Nework, Our Core Themes available at http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/
front-content.php?idcatart=2 ("We support simplicity and a level playing field on tax."); See also Rebecca
Christie & Robert Schmid, Geithner Calls for New 'Rules of the Game' in Finance, REUTERS (March 26, 2009)
("'To address this will require comprehensive reform,' Geithner said at a House Financial Services Committee
hearing. 'Not modest repairs at the margin, but new rules of the game."'); For criticism of the concept of a "level
playing field" see William Vicek, "A Level Playing Field and the Space for Small States," Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Feb 28, 2007.
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so frustrates proponents of greater regu-
lation of financial markets.
Part of the competition for economic
activity involves provision of law and
competition among states, which helps
shape the law they provide.4 This compe-
tition takes place within a framework of
international law including treaties, cus-
tomary public and private law, and con-
flict of law rules. Like any competitor
with power to affect the rules of the
game, however, states seek to alter this
framework to provide themselves with
advantages against their competitors.
The global financial crisis provided a
powerful group of states, including the
United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany, with an opportu-
nity to change the rules of international
regulatory competition to disadvantage
offshore financial centers (OFCs) in their
competition with these onshore govern-
ments over financial services. Putting
White House Chief of Staff Rahm Eman-
uel's dictum of "never let a serious crisis
go to waste"5 into practice, interest
groups favoring additional regulation in
these onshore jurisdictions have sought
to use the financial crisis to seek changes
in the rules of the game for international
financial competition that reduce OFCs'
comparative advantages.
After briefly describing some of the
changes sought by pro-regulation onshore
interests, I will discuss three of the
claims made in support of such regula-
tions: (1) that OFCs provide lax regula-
tory regimes that undercut onshore
efforts to provide stability; (2) that confi-
dentiality laws undercut onshore efforts
at financial regulation; and (3) that tax
competition inhibits onshore regulatory
efforts. I conclude that these are an in-
sufficient basis for limiting regulatory
competition.
Changing the Rules
Soon after the current financial crisis
began, public officials of onshore econo-
mies began to blame offshore financial
centers ("OFCs") for contributing to the
crisis and to call for regulatory measures
to limit OFCs' abilities to compete in the
global financial market: New York City
District Attorney Robert Morgenthau
complained that "vast sums of money ...
lie outside the jurisdiction of U.S. regula-
tors and other supervisory authorities."6
UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown called
on "the whole of the world to take action.
That will mean action against regulatory
and tax havens in parts of the world
which have escaped the regulatory atten-
tion they need."7 French President Nico-
las Sarkozy denounced "the excesses of
financial capitalism which has exper-
ienced serious abuses: concealment of
risks, uncontrolled sophistication of fi-
4. ERIN O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET _ (Oxford University Press) (2008).
5. A 40-Year Wish List, WALL ST.J., January 28, 2009, at A14.
6. Robert M. Morgenthau, Too Much Money is Beyond Legal Reach, WALL ST.J., September 30, 2008 at
A19 available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122273062657688131.html.
7. Nigel Morris, Brown leads global drive to close down tax havens," THE SUNDAY INDEPENDENT,




nancial instruments, gaps in regulation
and persistence of tax havens capturing a
part of global savings that would be more
justly employed financing investment
and growth.""
At the same time, several large coun-
tries are acting inconsistently with well-
established international legal principles
as part of efforts to restrict competition
by OFCs. In the United States, the
Obama Administration endorsed the Stop
Tax Haven Abuse Act, legislation pro-
posed by Sen. Carl Levin aimed squarely
at OFCs that did not cooperate with the
U.S. Treasury in enforcing American tax
laws. The Levin proposal requires that
OFCs assist in stopping not only criminal
tax evasion but also legal tax avoidance,9
ignoring well-established international
law principles that jurisdictions are not
required to assist each other in collection
of tax revenue.'0 In a second departure
from normal state-to-state conduct, Ger-
many and other European governments
have paid millions of Euros to the thief
for account data stolen from a Liechten-
stein bank and Germany created a new
identity for the informant through a wit-
ness protection program-despite Liech-
tenstein's attempt to arrest the
informant for violation of its banking
laws," a dramatic unwillingness to abide
by the usual norms of comity toward a
fellow member of the European single
market. In a third major departure from
established international legal principles,
Britain invoked anti-terrorism laws
against a bank in NATO ally Iceland to
seize assets after the bank's internet sub-
sidiary collapsed, putting the bank on the
same terrorism list as al-Qaeda.12 All
these measures are expressions of inter-
est groups within large, developed econo-
mies' desire to rewrite the rules to limit
regulatory and tax competition by small
jurisdictions.
If successful, these efforts will dam-
age the world economy by removing an
important set of competitors from the
scene. The losers will include not just the
residents of OFCs but the residents of the
developed economies, since OFCs play an
important role in encouraging transac-
tion cost minimizing regulatory and fi-
8. Quoted in Sarkozy on Tax Havens, and more, Tax Justice Network, August 28, 2008 available at http:/
/taxjustice.blogspot.com/2008/08/sarkozy-on-tax-havens.html, original speech, XVIeme Conference Des Ambas-
sadeurs Discours Du President De La Republique, M. Nicolas Sarkozy available at http://www.ambafrance-
uk.org/XVIeme-conference-des-Ambassadeurs.html.
9. Kevin Drawbaugh & Corbett Daly, Obama admin. backs tax haven bill, Reuters Mar. 3, 2009 available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE5
2 2 7lL 2 0 09 0303 (endorsement). S. 506, Stop Tax Ha-
ven Abuse Act, §101 (requiring jurisdictions to assist in ending tax avoidance).
10. See Rose-Marie Antoine, The Legitimacy of the Offshore Financial Sector - A Legal Perspective, in
REGULATORY COMPETITION & OFFSHORE FINANcIAL CENTERS (forthcoming).
11. See, e.g., Informant in German Investigation 'Fears' for his Life, Der Spiegel, March 8, 2008 available
at http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,151
8 ,5 4 0 28 3 ,00.html; Mark Landler, Liechtenstein Issues





nancial innovations.1 3 Moreover, OFCs
play a critical role in pressuring auto-
cratic governments into ceding power
over their economies to market forces, re-
ducing the scope of autocracies' ability to
interfere with the rule of law.14
Governments compete to attract eco-
nomic activity to their jurisdiction for
three reasons. All governments require
economic activity within their jurisdic-
tion to generate the tax revenues neces-
sary to fund their operation.15 To draw
economic activity to their jurisdictions,
governments can offer direct incentives
(e.g. tax exemptions, direct subsidies), ef-
fectively discounting the price of operat-
ing within their boundaries. Such
discounts are costly, however, as they re-
duce the net revenue to the government
from the economic activity. Moreover, di-
rect subsidies can lead to "price wars"
among jurisdictions competing for the ec-
onomic activity and investments lured by
discounts are vulnerable to better offers
from competing jurisdictions.
Governments also compete for eco-
nomic activity by providing subsidized
services that lower transactions costs, in-
cluding the rule of law. Moreover, gov-
ernments can offer packages that consist
of more than simple enforcement of con-
tracts and protection of property rights as
part of their provision of the rule of law.
To encourage economic activity, govern-
ments can provide efficiency-enhancing
rules. For example, providing standard
corporate, partnership, and other entities
reduces transactions costs and encour-
ages economic activity within a jurisdic-
tion.
When one jurisdiction discovers a
new efficiency-enhancing innovation, it
can lure economic activities to it. Other
jurisdictions then must adopt similar in-
novations if they are to compete effec-
tively. The spread of the LLC in the
United States following its initial adop-
tion by Wyoming is an example of such
competition. 6 The development of segre-
gated portfolio companies (also known as
segregated cell companies) by offshore ju-
risdictions is another, with several do-
mestic U.S. jurisdictions soon following
the OFCs' lead and adopting their own
laws allowing versions of these entities .
Competition can also produce bad
outcomes. For example, actors interested
in committing fraud may offer benefits to
governments to turn a blind eye to the
fraud. Antigua's relationship to Sir Allen
13. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Role of Offshore Financial Centers in Regulatory Competition, REGULA-
TORY COMPETITION & OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS, U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LEO7-
032. available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1275390; See also Jonathan R. Macey & Anna Manasco
Dionne, Offshore Finance & Onshore Markets: Racing to the Bottom or Moving Toward Efficient?
14. Id.
15. Benevolent governments also seek to encourage economic activity because such activity directly in-
creases the wealth of their citizens. Malevolent governments will seek economic activity because it generates
wealth they can confiscate.
16. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, The Evolving Partnership, 26 J. CORP. L. 819 (2001); O'HARA & RIBSTEIN,
supra note 4, at 29, 114; Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST.
L. J. 1459 (1998).
17. Morriss, supra note 13.
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Stanford and Stanford International
Bank, which appears to have been little
more than a sizeable Ponzi scheme,' 8 is a
recent example.'" The legal literature
contains many claims of such competition
producing a "race to the bottom," includ-
ing with respect to Delaware's role in cor-
porate governance, although these claims
are often contested.20 The challenge is to
distinguish legitimate efforts to prevent
fraud, money laundering, and other crim-
inal activity from efforts to weaken com-
petitors under the guise of tackling such
problems. Thus evaluating regulatory
competition requires that we attempt to
determine whether it will lead to good
outcomes (promoting efficiency enhanc-
ing, wealth maximizing innovations) or
bad outcomes (races to the bottom that
reduce welfare).
There are a number of reasons to
think regulatory competition is likely to
be beneficial. Erin O'Hara and Larry Rib-
stein have offered a theory of regulatory
competition based on domestic interest
groups lobbying for laws that will attract
outsiders to do business in a jurisdiction,
with the additional business benefiting
the domestic interest groups (e.g. the Del-
aware corporate bar benefits from the use
of Delaware by out-of-state corporations
as the state of incorporation). 2 1 Jonathan
Macey and Anna Dionne have recently
argued that competition between offshore
and onshore jurisdictions produces effi-
ciency-increasing competition to offer
regulatory measures and innovations in
both onshore and offshore jurisdictions as
a result of competition to offer "optimal
laxity."22 Rose-Marie Antoine has shown
that offshore jurisdictions are more inno-
vative than onshore jurisdictions in de-
veloping governance mechanisms for
trusts as a result of their competition for
trust business.23 I have argued elsewhere
that OFCs have produced beneficial inno-
vations in hedge fund and captive insur-
ance law.24
However, as noted earlier the finan-
cial crisis has prompted a wide range of
policy proposals from onshore govern-
ments aimed at restricting the ability of
OFCs to compete with the onshore gov-
ernments. Implicit in these proposals is
the argument that competition between
OFCs and onshore governments reduces
onshore jurisdictions' ability to regulate
in beneficial ways. Other critics of OFCs
have argued that offshore jurisdictions
promote fraud and theft, particularly in
countries with poor governance and pro-
posed regulatory measures limiting com-
18. S.E.C., SEC Charges Two Accountants And Antiguan Regulator For Roles In Stanford Ponzi Scheme,
Litigation Release No. 21092, June 19, 2009 available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/
Ir21092.htm.
19. Stacey-Marie Ishmael, Sir Allen's Antigua, or the curious case of Stanford International Bank, FT
Alphaville, Feb. 17, 2009 available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2009/02/17/52560/sir-allens-antigua-or-the-
curious-case-of-stanford-international-bank/.
20. See O'ILAA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 4, at - (summarizing debate).
21. Id.
22. Macey & Dionne, supra note 13.
23. Antoine, supra note 10.
24. Morriss, supra note 13.
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petition from OFCs. 25 These proposals
rest on two propositions:
Onshore government regulatory ef-
forts in financial services are undercut by
competition from OFCs.
Restricting competition from OFCs
will therefore enhance onshore regula-
tory efforts in financial services.
Both of these statements are contro-
versial, although the policymakers mak-
ing these arguments have generally
treated them as self-evident and not re-
quiring an effort to provide proof.26 Both
are related to important questions about
the role of the state in regulating finan-
cial markets.
Do OFCs Undercut Onshore Regula-
tion of Financial Services?
The claim that onshore regulatory ef-
forts are undercut by the regulatory com-
petition provided by OFCs can be divided
into three parts. First, onshore regulators
claim that offshore jurisdictions regulate
too little.27 Second, onshore regulators
argue that offshore confidentiality laws
allow onshore taxpayers to illegally evade
taxes they owe onshore governments. 28
Third, onshore governments argue that
the lower tax rates in offshore jurisdic-
tions reduce onshore governments' abili-
ties to tax their citizens by enabling
onshore taxpayers to structure transac-
tions to reduce their taxes.2 9
Regulatory Laxity
Are offshore financial centers too lax
in regulating financial services provid-
ers? There are three reasons to believe
they are not. First, there is no agreed ob-
jective measure of regulatory stringency
by which we can compare regulators in
different jurisdictions. While onshore
politicians sometimes suggest that OFCs
are unregulated, regulators in major
OFCs often have broader powers than on-
shore regulators. For example, one of the
Cayman Islands' chief financial regula-
tors, the Financial Secretary, described
an interview he conducted with a banker
he suspected of problematic behavior as
follows: "I called [the banker] to my office,
locked the door behind him, and seriously
questioned his involvement [in the activi-
ties], while reminding him of his moral
and official obligations in the community
as a Class A banker." Ultimately, the
regulator concluded that the banker's
25. See, e.g., RAYMOND BAKER, CAPITALISM'S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND How To RENEW THE
FREE-MARKET SYSTEM (2005).
26. A third, unstated premise underlying these proposals is the claim that increasing the effectiveness of
onshore regulatory efforts in financial services will lead to improved financial stability and prevent events like
those that produced the current financial crisis from recurring. Addressing this question is beyond the scope of
this Article.
27. See note 7 supra.
28. See EU proposes tougher rules to tackle tax evasion, AFP, Nov. 13, 2008 available at http://
afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iX8cL3opKyKcyNXGXCkgScluQnw.
29. See, United States Department of the Treasury, Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and
Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas, May 4, 2009 available at http://www.treas.gov/press/re-
leases/tg119.htm (United States government "seek[s] to reduce the amount of taxes lost to tax havens - either
through unintended loopholes that allow companies to legally avoid paying billions in taxes, or through the
illegal use of hidden accounts by well-off individuals.").
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"side of the story had merits and I ac-
cepted it. However, before unlocking my
door for his exit, I impressed on him the
fact that if at any time he should slip out
of his bounds as a banker and hurt people
or the local banking community, I would
see him behind bars."3o It is impossible to
imagine such an interview between, for
example, the U.S. Secretary of the Trea-
sury and the head of an American bank
without the presence of a herd of lawyers
on both sides, an absence of similarly
frank discussion, and a press conference
on the Treasury steps at which the ag-
grieved banker and his lawyers de-
nounced the heavy-handed efforts of the
Treasury. Comparing regulatory
frameworks thus requires both evaluat-
ing formal rules and powers and the ac-
tual practice of regulation across
jurisdictions.3 ' Leading OFCs like Ber-
muda, the Cayman Islands, the Channel
Islands, Dubai, and Singapore offer a
combination of laws, regulations, regula-
tors, and regulatory culture that makes
the effective degree of regulation at least
equal to that in onshore jurisdictions, al-
though sometimes with different goals. 3 2
Second, offshore jurisdictions have
large investments in their reputations,
since any offshore jurisdiction that al-
lowed significant fraudulent or criminal
behavior would quickly lose its ability to
attract business and so deprive its popu-
lation of the benefit of the offshore finan-
cial sector.38 These revenues are
significant: the Cayman Islands derive
approximately half their government rev-
enues from offshore-financial industry
fees and a significant portion of tourism
there is finance-industry-related as
well.34 As a result, the major OFCs have
invested heavily in their regulatory infra-
structure. For example, the Cayman Is-
lands' major regulator is the Cayman
Islands Monetary Authority, whose board
consists of financial professionals drawn
from both the islands and internationally
and whose credentials compare favorably
to those of regulators in the United
States.3 5 The Cayman Islands Stock Ex-
change is an affiliate member of the In-
ternational Organization of Securities
Commissions, a member of the In-
termarket Surveillance Group and recog-
nized by the U.K. Revenue and Customs
Board, signals that it meets international
standards and allowing listed securities
to be sold in major markets.36 Major
OFCs are regularly reviewed by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, an organiza-
tion controlled by onshore governments,
and generally received favorable reviews
when compared against best practices
30. VASSEL JOHNSON, As I SEE IT: How CAYMAN BECAME A LEADING FINANCIAL SECTOR 159-160 (2001).
Note that the banker, Jean Doucet, eventually did end up behind bars on an unrelated matter; id. at 163-164.
31. See Andrew P. Morriss, Regulatory Intensity & Offshore Financial Centers, Working Paper (2009).
32. Id.
33. A similar argument is made concerning Delaware's role as a provider of corporate law within the
United States. See Macey & Dionne, supra note 13.
34. Andrew P. Morriss & Craig M. Boise, Creating Cayman, (Working Paper, 2009).
35. Morriss, supra note 31.




standards that onshore governments
sometimes do not themselves meet.3 7
British OFCs are also reviewed by the
British Treasury, and also have received
favorable reviews.3 Thus by most objec-
tive measures, the major OFCs (if not the
less developed ones like Antigua) have
been successful at providing adequate
regulation, at times even exceeding the
regulatory stringency of onshore govern-
ments. There is some indirect evidence to
support this contention: the most dra-
matic frauds in recent years have oc-
curred not in OFCs but in onshore
jurisdictions: Enron, Parmalat, and
Madoff are all financial scandals with on-
shore roots.
Third, even among regulators in ma-
jor onshore financial centers there are
dramatic differences in how regulatory
agencies are structured, the regulatory
philosophy, and the regulations imposed
on financial services firms. For example,
the United States and the United King-
dom take dramatically different ap-
proaches to financial services regulation
in both the structure of their respective
regulators and the type of regulation.3 9
The competition between the New York
City and London over the financial ser-
vices business is at least as intense as the
competition between those financial cen-
ters and OFCs.40 Thus aside from juris-
dictions without any serious regulatory
oversight (e.g. Antigua) or corruption
problems (e.g. the Turks & Caicos Is-
lands),'41 the largest OFCs provide what is
best described as a different form of regu-
lation rather than an absence of regula-
tion. This is not surprising; as Macey
and Dionne note, jurisdictions compete in
many regulatory dimensions and zero is
not always the desired level of regulation
by financial services firms.42 Since OFCs
specialize in products for sophisticated
investors, it is not surprising that OFCs
regulate differently from onshore juris-
dictions where regulatory concern is fo-
cused on retail products .4 Thus the
differences between OFCs and onshore
regulators are differences in focus, philos-
ophy, and approach similar to the differ-
ences among onshore jurisdictions rather
than differences in regulatory laxity. The
differences between onshore and offshore
regulators are thus not adequately de-
scribed as two ends of a uni-dimensional
spectrum. The regulatory competition is
thus better described as a competition for
the optimal level of regulation.
37. Richard K. Gordon, The International MonetaryFund & the Regulation of Offshore Centers, REGULA-
TORY COMPETITION & OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS (forthcoming).
38. Morriss, supra note 31.
39. See James D. Cox & Edward F. Greene, Financial Regulation in a Global Market Place: Report of the
Duke Global Capital Markets Roundtable, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 239, 243-244 (2007).
40. See Edward F. Greene, Modernizing U.S. Regulation of Capital Markets, in SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE: A CONTRAST IN EU AND US PRovISIoNS, 379-390 (Practicing Law
Institute 2008).
41. Alex Barker, "Turks and Caicos premier hits out at UK moves," Financial Times, March 18, 2009 at
al; M Rensselaer W. Lee III, THE WHITE LABYRINTH: COCAINE AND POLITICAL POWER 183 (Transaction Publish-
ers)(1991).
42. Macey & Dionne, supra note 13.




Onshore governments regularly at-
tack offshore governments for providing
strong financial privacy laws. An attack
on confidentiality is central to the pro-
posed Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act in the
United States, with the draft legislation
including a series of presumptions to dis-
advantage those jurisdictions that fail to
assist the United States in stopping tax
avoidance as well as tax evasion .44
Does confidentiality undermine on-
shore efforts at regulation? Certainly the
inability of onshore law enforcement or
tax authorities to obtain comprehensive
information on offshore financial activity
means that money laundering and tax
evasion are more likely to succeed than if
onshore authorities had complete infor-
mation. But success in law enforcement
and tax collection are not the sole metrics
by which policies must be evaluated. As
Rose-Marie Antoine argues, "[that confi-
dentiality can sometimes be abused does
not make confidentiality itself an abusive
or illegitimate concept. Rather, we have
accepted that in every financial endeavor
and structure there will be weaknesses
and what we need to do is to have checks
and balances and avenues for redress."45
Financial privacy is not something of
interest only to OFCs or money launders.
Confidentiality in financial matters is a
well-established principle in both civil
and common law. For example, most com-
mon law OFCs trace their confidentiality
laws to the landmark 1924 U.K. decision,
Tournier v. National Provincial Bank
46
and confidentiality in commercial mat-
ters is the basis for the protection of trade
secrets, a position that the United States
(among others) has vigorously asserted.47
Civil law jurisdictions have their own
long history of respecting financial pri-
vacy.4 8 Differences over confidentiality
between onshore jurisdictions and OFCs
thus reflect differences in emphasis, not
differences in kind.
Further, financial confidentiality also
protects opposition politicians from coun-
tries like Venezuela, Russia, and
Zimbabwe, where governments have at-
tempted to undercut domestic opponents
by attacking their financial resources. 4 9
A significant problem with the attacks on
confidentiality by the European Union
and United States is that those attacks
make it harder for jurisdictions to refuse
requests for information from unsavory
regimes.
Confidentiality is thus not an issue
on which onshore governments can legiti-
mately claim that other interests must
yield to their interests in enforcing their
tax laws. Rather it requires that jurisdic-
tions negotiate accommodations to each
others' interests, with both OFCs and on-
44. See note 9 supra.
45. Antoine, supra note 10.
46. Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial Bank, [19241 1 K.B. 461.
47. Antoine, supra note 10.
48. Antoine, supra note 10.
49. Morriss, supra note 13.
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shore jurisdictions treating each others'
interests as deserving of respect.50
At the moment, the onshore assault
on offshore jurisdictions' confidentiality
laws is yielding some results, with Swit-
zerland tentatively agreeing to breaches
of bank secrecy that would have been pre-
viously unthinkable as a result of the
UBS scandal.61 And if the Stop Tax Ha-
ven Abuse Act becomes law in the United
States in anything approximating its
summer 2009 form, it will be virtually
impossible for any jurisdiction to avoid a
high degree of cooperation with the
United States tax authorities to avoid the
draconian presumptions the act will ap-
ply to non-cooperative jurisdictions.52
These changes are unlikely to have
the effects their sponsors anticipate, how-
ever. Confidentiality was vital to the
1960s and 1970s business models of
OFCs seeking individual wealth manage-
ment business but is irrelevant to the
1990s and later business models built on
aircraft financing, captive insurance, as-
set securitization, and hedge fund domi-
cile.63 Moreover, criminal enterprises
and tax cheats seeking to launder or con-
ceal assets will need only to further de-
velop their existing financial networks
outside the formal financial system (e.g.
the Black Market Peso Exchange) or pay
the additional transactions costs of more
complex financial structures to avoid
triggering onshore regulatory attention.4
In sum, even if onshore pressure on
OFCs over confidentiality laws is success-
ful, it is not likely to yield significant dif-
ferences in financial services activities
because confidentiality is not an integral
part of modern OFCs' business models.
Tax Competition
Tax competition is often misleadingly
described as a simple competition be-
tween high and low tax jurisdictions over
rates applied to a single form of taxation.
Rather, as Craig Boise has noted, differ-
ent jurisdictions have different tax struc-
tures and those differences create
opportunities for business structuring to
reduce overall tax bills.66 For example,
the "zero tax" Cayman Islands indeed
50. Antoine, supra note 10; Craig M. Boise, Regulating Competition in Offshore Financial Centers (Case
Research Papers Series in Legal Studies, Paper No. 08-26, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1266329.
51. See Carrick Mollenkamp, et al., UBS to Give 4,450 Names to U.S.: Tax-Evasion Pact May Disclose
10,000 Clients: Swiss Government, WALL ST.J., Aug. 20, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB125068571743342973.html. Swiss law allows the major changes the United States is seeking be subject to
referenda in the cantons and so any tentative agreement with the Swiss federal government may not survive
that process. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, TREATY MAKING - EXPRESSION OF CONSENT BY STATES TO BE BOUND BY A
TREATY 268-269 (2001). It is not clear, however, that reducing the scope of confidentiality provisions will actu-
ally produce a major increase in enforcement of onshore tax and regulatory laws.
52. See supra note 9.
53. Indeed, even by 1976 when the Cayman Islands created the Confidential Relationships (Protection)
Act, making it a criminal offense to reveal confidential information, the Act's main purpose was to build confi-
dence in the jurisdiction's reliability rather than to shelter dodgy money. See Morriss & Boise, supra note 34.
54. See James Sloan, Black Market Peso Exchange Update, 12 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
FinCEN Advisory, June 1999, available at http://www.fincen.gov/news room/rp/advisory/pdfladvisl2.pdf.
55. Boise, supra note 50.
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have no income tax but they have what is
effectively a hefty sales tax (with rates
approaching 50% on some goods).56 Cay-
man also has significant property trans-
fer taxes.5 1 Cayman's tax structure is
similar to that used by Texas, which also
has no income tax and a predominately
sales and property tax regime.58 Not sur-
prisingly, given onshore jurisdictions' hy-
pocrisy on tax practices,"9 Cayman, but
not Texas, is considered to be engaged in
"unfair tax competition" and is the sub-
ject of pressure from onshore govern-
ments over its tax structure.
Differences in tax systems are inevi-
table because the purpose of tax rules dif-
fers among societies and because of path-
dependent choices about definitions and
concepts. As a result, businesses have an
incentive to minimize their costs by
structuring themselves to minimize the
total cost of doing business (legal and ac-
counting fees plus tax payments). On-
shore governments can restrict such
competition by erecting barriers that
raise the cost of using OFC structures,
but they do so at a cost to themselves.
For example, Barbados has an extensive
network of tax treaties that allow compa-
nies from high tax jurisdictions (e.g. Ca-
nada) to reduce their tax burden on
international operations below the do-
mestic level.6 o Opponents of tax competi-
tion typically portray this as a loss of tax
revenue to the high tax domestic jurisdic-
tion.61 It is equally possible, however, to
consider it as enabling the high tax juris-
diction to price discriminate in its taxa-
tion between international and domestic
activity, applying a higher rate to domes-
tic income than would be possible other-
wise. For example, Canadian natural
resource companies, among the world's
leaders in their field, would find it diffi-
cult to compete internationally if they
had to pay domestic Canadian tax rates
on their non-Canadian operations.
Moreover, there are a number of ar-
eas where taxation is irrelevant to OFCs'
business models. For example, the Cay-
man Islands are the domicile of the cap-
tive insurance companies of many U.S.
non-profit health care providers, a group
unconcerned with taxation of earnings.
And many offshore captives opt to pay
U.S. income taxes as if they were U.S. en-
tities, again making tax issues irrelevant
to the decision to locate offshore. Simi-
larly, many investors in offshore hedge
funds are nonprofit organizations, such
as university endowments. For these in-
vestors, the tax exemption of an OFC-
based hedge fund is not a means of avoid-
ing U.S. income taxes. Finally, tax-re-
lated OFC structures often offer onshore
jurisdictions considerable benefits. For
56. The tax is collected as an import duty. Because the Islands import virtually everything and because
virtually all imports come through a relatively easy to monitor port, the tax can be collected most efficiently as
a duty rather than at the point of sale.
57. See Stamp Duty Rates, available at http://www.tamarasiemens.com/stampduty.html.
58. See Tax Foundation, Texas, available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/research/topic/60.html
59. Boise, supra note 50.
60. See, e.g., Jamal Hejazi & Matthew Zadro, Canada: Barbados International Business Corporations,
GOWLINGS, July 3, 2008, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=62580.
61. See, e.g., OXFAm, TAx HAVENS: RELEASING THE HIDDEN BILLIONS FOR POVERTY ERADICATION (2000).
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example, the use of finance subsidiaries
in the Netherlands Antilles in the 1970s
and early 1980s saved U.S. corporate bor-
rowers an estimated 2-3% interest be-
cause such subsidiaries allowed the U.S.
parents to obtain financing in the
cheaper Eurodollar market.62
Tax structuring undoubtedly plays a
role in some aspects of modern OFC busi-
ness models but it is less important than
onshore governments appear to believe.
As a result, onshore governments efforts
to limit tax competition are likely to be at
least partially counterproductive, since
obstructing use of OFCs will deny the
benefits of OFC structures to onshore ju-
risdictions' economies. To the extent that
tax competition from OFCs does limit the
upper level of tax rates an onshore juris-
diction can charge, an onshore jurisdic-
tion wishing to charge more must simply
find other margins on which to compete.
New York and France are able to levy
high taxes on entities operating within
their boundaries despite tax competition
from Texas and Ireland because the for-
mer two jurisdictions offer amenities and
advantages not available in the latter
two.62 New York and France may not be
able to accomplish all of their tax policy
objectives, but their tax policies can
hardly be said to have been completely
frustrated by tax competition from lower
tax jurisdictions within or without the
United States and European Union.
Will Limiting Competition by
OFCs Enhance Onshore
Regulation?
The short answer is "'no." The signifi-
cant OFCs like Bermuda, the Cayman Is-
lands, the Channel Islands, Hong Kong
and Singapore provide important compe-
tition for onshore jurisdictions. Rather
than undermining onshore regulation,
OFCs can play a constructive role in in-
ternational finance for three reasons.
First, OFCs offer onshore jurisdictions
important advantages. OFCs provide a
means of price-discrimination. Some eco-
nomic activities sensitive to transactions
costs, including tax rates, relocate to
OFCs. But the profits from the OFC-lo-
cated segment ultimately will be rein-
vested or spent in onshore jurisdictions,
creating more economic activity onshore,
because investment opportunities within
OFCs are too small to absorb the capital
created by the offshore sector. As the ex-
ample of Canadian natural resource com-
panies shows, allowing businesses to opt
out of domestic tax regimes for their in-
ternational businesses can have impor-
tant benefits for both shareholders and
businesses. As the nonprofit health care
captive example shows, OFCs offer more
ways to cut transactions costs than low
taxes.
Second, the constraints imposed on
well-run onshore economies by OFCs are
relatively small and likely affect large
economies like the United States and Eu-
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63. The mix of taxes charged by New York and France may be different than it would be in the absence of
tax competition.
Andrew P. Morriss
ropean Union only on the margin. For ex-
ample, even assuming the worst case
scenario, nominal U.S. corporate tax
rates remain among the world's highest.6 4
At most, OFCs offer some American busi-
nesses a chance to lower their tax rates in
the same fashion as the complexities of
the Internal Revenue Code do for
others.65 Confidentiality provisions are
largely irrelevant to most business struc-
tures and virtually all OFCs already have
tax information exchange agreements
that permit transfer of information where
there is specific evidence of criminal ac-
tivity. Even the impact of legal innova-
tions offshore is attenuated by the
additional transactions costs of operating
in multiple jurisdictions. It seems hard
to credit onshore politicians' claims that
there is a significant pool of unregulated
and under-taxed funds to be recaptured
by new international financial regula-
tions. Where OFCs likely have a larger
impact is on smaller economies, where
the ability to opt out of a corrupt or ineffi-
cient legal system is important to creat-
ing viable non-state sectors. 6 6
Third, setting the "rules of the game"
for international finance is properly the
subject of multilateral negotiations
among all affected jurisdictions. The do-
mestic interests of any one sector,
whether concerned with tax collections or
securities regulation, cannot be the only
concern. In their efforts to resist compe-
tition from OFCs, the United States and
European Union risk damaging an inter-
national financial system that has served
the world economy well since World War
II. Rather than changing the rules, on-
shore jurisdictions should strive to com-
pete more effectively on the merits.
64. See Scott A. Hodge & Andre Dammert, U.S. Lags While Competitors Accelerate Corporate Income Tax
Reform 184 TAx FOUND. (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ffl84.pdf.
65. See Chye-Ching Huang, Putting U.S. Corporate Taxes in Perspective, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY
PRIORITIES, Oct. 27, 2008, available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=784.
66. Morriss, supra note 13.
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